A Secure Wireless Routing Protocol Using Enhanced Chain Signatures by Saxena, Amitabh
ar
X
iv
:0
90
7.
40
85
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
3 J
ul 
20
09
A Secure Wireless Routing Protocol Using
Enhanced Chain Signatures
Amitabh Saxena
International University, Bruchsal 76646, Germany
Abstract: We propose a routing protocol for wireless networks. Wireless
routing protocols allow hosts within a network to have some knowledge of the
topology in order to know when to forward a packet (via broadcast) and when
to drop it. Since a routing protocol forms the backbone of a network, it is a
lucrative target for many attacks, all of which attempt to disrupt network traffic
by corrupting routing tables of neighboring routers using false updates. Secure
routing protocols designed for wired networks (such as S-BGP) are not scalable
in an ad-hoc wireless environment because of two main drawbacks: (1) the need
to maintain knowledge about all immediate neighbors (which requires a discovery
protocol), and (2) the need to transmit the same update several times, one for
each neighbor. Although information about neighbors is readily available in a
fairly static and wired network, such information is often not updated or available
in an ad-hoc wireless network with mobile devices. Our protocol is a variant of
S-BGP called SS-BGP and allows a single broadcast for routing updates without
having the need to be aware of every neighboring router. The protocol is based
on a novel authentication primitive called Enhanced Chain Signatures (ECS).
1 Introduction
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1,2] is a Path Vector Routing protocol,
in which routers repeatedly advertise ‘better’ routes (along with the path de-
tails) to their immediate neighbors. On receiving an update, a router checks its
routing table to decide if this advertised route is better than its existing routes.
If so, the router updates its table and advertises the new route to all its other
immediate neighbors. The ‘textbook’ variant of BGP (hereafter called BGP)
has many security vulnerabilities [3,4]. For instance, a rogue router could claim
a shorter route to some destination in order to intercept traffic. Therefore, real
implementations use a modified variant of BGP called Secure-BGP (S-BGP). In
S-BGP, routers must have knowledge of immediate neighbors and updates are
peer-specific. In the context of ad-hoc wireless networks, a node with several re-
ceivers in its vicinity must first establish the identity of every such receiver who
is also a forwarder, and then broadcast as many updates. Such control plane
traffic becomes a bottleneck in scenarios where the wireless devices are densely
distributed, power constrained and have low data plane traffic.
In [5], a novel signature scheme called Chain Signatures (CS) is proposed. As
an application, a secure routing protocol called Stateless Secure BGP (SS-BGP)
is also presented. The attack scenario described is of a “route truncation attack”1
in wired networks. SS-BGP is as secure as S-BGP and has some advantages.
The main advantages in their protocol over S-BGP are: (1) updates can be
broadcast and need not be peer-specific, and (2) routers need not be aware of
their immediate neighbors. However, such advantages are not overwhelming in
the scenario presented in [5] because true broadcast channels do not exist in
wired networks. On the other hand, wireless networks provide true broadcast
channels without the ability to control or determine who receives this broadcast.
This feature presents a perfect application scenario for SS-BGP. We extend the
work of [5] and propose a protocol for wireless routing. The protocol optimizes
traffic in the control plane by allowing an ad-hoc network of wireless nodes
to establish routing information in presence of several compromised nodes and
without any prior knowledge of topology. The protocol is based on an extension
of CS called Enhanced Chain Signatures (ECS).
2 Wireless Routing using BGP
Notation: The following discussion is based on Figure 1, which shows a wireless
network. The circles represent areas of coverage of the transmitter nodes located
at their centers, which are represented by small colored discs. The arrows rep-
resent various messages broadcast by the nodes at the tail. Note that although
the arrows point to particular directions, every node within the corresponding
circle is able to receive that message. Each circle has the same radius so that
any node X is covered by some node Y iff Y is covered by X . Two nodes with
non-overlapping coverage can communicate by using intermediate nodes as for-
warders. Each node has a permanently active receiver and a passive transmitter
that activates when a message is to be sent or a received message is to be for-
warded. All messages sent by the transmitter are broadcast to anyone in the
covered area. Senders of broadcasts are uniquely determined via this public key.
In other words, it is not possible for a broadcasting node to conceal its identity.
The symbol X ⇐ Y denotes the string “There is a metric 1 path from Y to
X” and the symbol X ⇐ denotes the string “There is a metric 0 path from X to
X”. The symbol X →: m indicates that m is broadcast by X . SX(m) indicates
a signature on message m by X using an existentially unforgeable signature
scheme (we assume that the signature scheme provides message recovery).
BGP updates: (control plane) Refer to Fig. 1. The following updates are
sent for routes to A. Each signature (except the first) implies a hop of metric 1.
1. A→: SA(A⇐)
2. B →: SA(A⇐), SB(A⇐ B)
3. C →: SA(A⇐), SB(A⇐ B), SC(B ⇐ C)
4. D →: SA(A⇐), SB(A⇐ B), SC(B ⇐ C), SD(C ⇐ D)
5. E →: SA(A⇐), SB(A⇐ B), SC(B ⇐ C), SE(C ⇐ E)
6. F →: SA(A⇐), SB(A⇐ B), SC(B ⇐ C), SD(C ⇐ D), SF (D ⇐ F )
1 Referred to as a path extraction attack in [5]
Fig. 1. A typical scenario for a route truncation attack in wireless networks.
After the above updates have been transmitted and all signatures are verified,
each node updates its routing table to contain a tuple (destination, next-hop,
metric). For instance C’s table will contain the entry (A,B, 2). See [1] and Sec-
tion 3.2 for details on how the nodes construct the table. The nodes use this table
to decide when to broadcast a received data packet and when to keep silent. If
a packet arrives from a node that is the next hop for the destination, then the
packet is dropped, otherwise it is forwarded.
Forwarding: (data plane) node E broadcasts a data packet destined to A.
On receiving this packet, node C will activate its transmitter to forward the
message (since C’s routing table shows that E is not the next-hop on route to
A). Both B and D will receive this broadcast from C but only B will activate
to forward it further (since D’s routing table shows that C is the next-hop for
destination A). Finally, the broadcast of B is received by A and there is no
further forwarding.
Route truncation attack: Although the signatures ensure that fake routes
cannot be created, they do not ensure that intermediate routes are not truncated.
As an example, F is an attacker who needs to intercept the above data packet.
First note that using the above updates, D’s routing table is set to discard data
packets received from C and addressed to A. Thus, such packets would never
be received by F . To launch its attack, F pretends to have a shorter route to A
than C does. To do this, F replaces its routing update broadcast in Step 6 with
the following:
F →: SA(A⇐), SF (A⇐ F )
On receiving this update, node D will believe that the route to A via F is
shorter. Consequently, D will update its routing table to forward a data packet
received from C and addressed to A. This general attack is called route trun-
cation. In this attack, every data packet sent by E and addressed to A will be
received by F . Although we only considered an eavesdropping attack, it is trivial
for F to launch a DoS attack. For instance, if F drops all data plane traffic, it
can ensure that data packets originating from D and addressed to A never reach
their destination.
Secure-BGP Routing: A possible way to disallow this attack is to use
Secure-BGP (S-BGP), which is an augmented version of BGP. S-BGP requires
that updates be recipient specific. Although S-BGP is designed for wired net-
works, the same concept can be adapted to wireless. S-BGP requires that each
host be aware of their immediate neighbors (in this context, receivers within its
coverage). S-BGP assumes that this information has somehow been established.
Let X and Y denote nodes within E’s and F ’s coverages respectively (but not
covered by any other node). The S-BGP updates are as follows.
1. A→: SA(A⇐ B)
2. B →: SA(A⇐ B), SB(B ⇐ C)
3. C →: SA(A⇐ B), SB(B ⇐ C), SC(C ⇐ D)
C →: SA(A⇐ B), SB(B ⇐ C), SC(C ⇐ E)
4. D →: SA(A⇐ B), SB(B ⇐ C), SC(C ⇐ D), SD(D ⇐ F )
5. E →: SA(A⇐ B), SB(B ⇐ C), SC(C ⇐ E), SE(E ⇐ X)
6. F →: SA(A⇐ B), SB(B ⇐ C), SC(C ⇐ D), SD(D ⇐ F ), SF (F ⇐ Y )
The above protocol is secure from route truncation attack. From an applica-
tion perspective, the only difference between (ordinary) BGP and S-BGP is that
while BGP is resistant to every attack except route truncation attacks, S-BGP
is also resistant to such attacks.
Stateless Routing: Observe that the S-BGP protocol of Example 2 has
two major drawbacks: (1) Each router must be “aware” of its neighbors, and (2)
In the example, router C can no longer broadcast the same message for every
neighbor. This has scalability problems as follows. Firstly, every transmitter must
have prior knowledge of all receivers within its coverage, which is clearly prob-
lematic. Secondly, since each update is peer-specific, even a single route change
could result in a large number of broadcasts by a node with many receivers in its
coverage. It would be much simpler if the underlying routing protocol resisted
route truncation attacks and required each router to broadcast only one short
message on each update without being aware of its neighbors/receivers. We call
such a protocol a Stateless Routing Protocol. To avoid the route truncation
attack in a stateless protocol, given the message in Step 4 of Example 1, attacker
F should not be able to extract SA(A ⇐). Our Contribution: We present a
stateless routing protocol that resists route truncation attacks. Our proposed
protocol, called Stateless Secure-BGP (SS-BGP) is a variation of S-BGP and
provides the following benefits:
1. It is fully stateless - routers need not be aware of their neighboring receivers.
2. It is communication efficient - one constant size broadcast per update irre-
spective of the number of peers.
2.1 Related Work
Current research assumes the stateful scenario of Example 2 (S-BGP), and is
focused on reducing the number of signatures transmitted and/or processing
time [6,7]. For instance, aggregate signatures have been proposed to keep the
signature payload to a constant size [6]. The authors of [8] propose the use
of Signature Amortization [7] coupled with aggregate or sequential aggregate
signatures [9] to reduce the size of update messages and the signing time. The
authors of [10] propose the use of identity-based sequential aggregate signatures
(IBSAS) to authenticate routing updates. However, the above works assume a
stateful environment, where information about immediate peers is known. and
do not consider the route truncation attack described above using Example 1
(where information about the next-hop is not available to the current signer).
Specifically, the above works do not consider the attack where given the message
in Step 6, router F is able to compute the message sent in Step 1 without
extracting the private keys of all of {A,B,C,D,E}.
3 The Building Blocks
Notation:We first develop some notation to deal with ordered elements, which
we call sequences.
1. A sequence is similar to a set except that the order of its elements is impor-
tant. Elements of a sequence are written in order, and enclosed within the
symbols 〈, 〉. For instance, 〈y1, y2, y3〉 is a sequence. The symbol θ denotes
the empty sequence with zero elements.
2. Let ℓa = 〈y1, y2, . . . , yk〉 be some non-empty sequence. For any other se-
quence ℓb, we say that ℓb ≺ ℓa if and only if ℓb = 〈y1, y2, . . . , yi〉 and
0 ≤ i ≤ k. We say that two sequences {ℓa, ℓb} overlap if there exists a non-
empty sequence ℓ such that ℓ ≺ ℓa and ℓ ≺ ℓb. For instance, {〈y1, y2〉 , 〈y1〉}
overlap, while {〈y1, y2〉 , 〈y2〉} do not.
3. For any two sequences ℓa, ℓb, the symbol ℓa ∪ ℓb denotes the set of elements
that belong to at least one of {ℓa, ℓb}. Similarly ℓa ∩ ℓb denotes the set of
elements that belong to both ℓa and ℓb. We denote by ℓa ⊙ ℓb to be the set
of elements from the largest sequence ℓ such that ℓ ≺ ℓa and ℓ ≺ ℓb. Clearly,
for two overlapping sequences {ℓa, ℓb}, we have that ℓa ⊙ ℓb 6= ∅.
4. Collapsing Rule: Any sequence 〈〈y1, y2, . . . yi〉 , yi+1〉 is equivalent to the se-
quence 〈y1, y2, . . . yi+1〉.
3.1 Enhanced Chain Signatures
In [5], a novel signature scheme called Chain Signatures (CS) is presented, which
is essentially a combination of Boneh et al.’s aggregate signatures and Verifiably
Encrypted Signatures (VES) [6]. The nice property about CS is that in addi-
tion to ordinary properties, they also provide truncation resilience. In the model
of [5], every signer signs the same message. We consider an extension of CS,
called Enhanced Chain Signatures (ECS) in which each signer may sign differ-
ent messages. Note that CS can be extended to allow signers to sign different
messages by using another existentially unforgeable signature scheme in conjunc-
tion as discussed in the original paper. However, ECS offers better performance
and a cleaner security definition. ECS is described below.
Algorithms: ECS are defined by 3 algorithms: ECS-(KeyGen, Sign, Verify).
ECS-KeyGen(τ) takes a parameter τ . It outputs a private-public key pair
(x, y).
ECS-Verify(ℓ, σ) takes as input ℓ = 〈(m1, y1), (m2, y2), . . .〉, a finite sequence
of (message, public key) pairs, and a string σ.
1. If ℓ = θ and σ = 1, the algorithm outputs VALID.
2. If ℓ = θ and σ 6= 1, the algorithm outputs INVALID.
3. If any public key yi repeats in ℓ, the algorithm outputs INVALID.
4. If this step is executed, the algorithm invokes a deterministic poly-time
procedure after which it outputs either VALID or INVALID.
ECS-Sign(xi, yi,mi, ℓj, σj) takes five inputs, which can be grouped into three
parts: (1) a (private key, public key, message) tuple (xi, yi,mi), (2) a sequence
ℓj = 〈(m1, y1), (m2, y2), . . . , (mj , yj)〉 of j (message, public key) pairs for
j ≥ 0, and (3) a string σj (a purported chain signature on ℓj).
1. If yi ∈ {y1, y2, . . . , yj}, the algorithm outputs ERROR.
2. If ECS-Verify(ℓj , σj) = INVALID, the algorithm outputs ERROR.
3. If this step is executed, the algorithm computes a chain signature σi on
ℓi, where ℓi = 〈ℓj, (mi, yi)〉. It outputs σi.
A string σ is an ECS signature on a sequence ℓ if ECS-Verify(ℓ, σ) = VALID.
Difference with a CS scheme: If for every sequence 〈(m1, y1), (m2, y2), . . .〉 to be
signed, holds ∀i : mi = m1, then the ECS scheme is also a CS scheme.
Security Model: We define the security of ECS in the adaptive known key (AKK)
model.2 This notion is called security under adaptive known key and chosen
message attack. We define two variants using a parameter ω such that setting
ω = 1 results in the weaker variant.
Game ECS-UNFω(τ)
Setup. The challenger gives the security parameter τ to the adversary A, who
then selects a game parameter n (the number of public keys) and an n
bit string extr (the 1s of extr denote the indexes of the public keys that
the adversary wants to extract). Let extr[i] denote the ith bit of extr. On
2 We note that our actual construction is actually secure in the stronger model of
Adaptive Chosen Key (ACK) attacks, where the adversary inserts/replaces chosen
public keys at chosen locations (and hands over the corresponding private keys to
the challenger). In the extended model, such public keys are considered equivalent
to those that have been extracted.
receiving (n, extr), the challenger generates n key-pairs (xi, yi)
R
← ECS-
KeyGen(τ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and gives the set Y = {yi}1≤i≤n of n public keys
along with set X = {xi|extr[i] = 1}1≤i≤n of extracted private keys to A.
In the following, we denote by L the set of all non-empty sequences of pairs
(m, y) ∈ {0, 1}∗ × Y such that no y is repeated.
Queries. Working adaptively, A makes queries as follows:
1. Extract : This query consists of a public key y ∈ Y . If ω = 1, the chal-
lenger responds with ⊥. Otherwise, it responds with the private key
corresponding to y.
2. ECS-Sign: This query consists of a sequence ℓ ∈ L. The challenger re-
sponds with an ECS signature on ℓ.
Output. A outputs a pair (ℓA, σA) ∈ L× {0, 1}
∗.
Result. A wins if ECS-Verify(ℓA, σA) = VALID and ℓA is non-signable (Def. 31).
Definition 31 (Non-signable Sequence) In the game, let YX ⊂ Y and LS ⊂
L be the set of inputs to the extract and ECS-sign queries respectively (Note:
{yi|extr[i] = 1}1≤i≤n ⊆ YX). For any ℓA ∈ L, define the set LA = {ℓi|ℓi ∈
LS ∧ {ℓA, ℓi} overlap}. ℓA is non-signable if:
1. ℓA /∈ LS
2. The set {(mi, yi)|(mi, yi) ∈ ℓA ∧ yi /∈ YX} is non-empty.
3. For every ℓi ∈ LA, the set {(mj , yj)|(mj , yj) ∈ (ℓi ∪ ℓA)\(ℓi⊙ ℓA)∧ yi /∈ YX}
is non-empty.
In the following, we also consider the use of hash functions in the construction.
Definition 32 The ECS scheme Σ is (n, τ, t, qs, qe, qh, ǫ)-UNF-ω-secure for
ω ∈ {1, 2} if, for game parameters τ and n, there is no adversary A that runs for
time at most t; makes at most (qs, qe, qh) chain-sign, extract and hash queries
respectively; and wins Game ECS-UNFω(τ) with probability at least ǫ.
Discussion: Roughly speaking, the above security notion implies security un-
der two types of forgeries [5]. We illustrate this with an example. The first
forgery (called ordinary forgery) occurs when the adversary manages to out-
put a valid ECS signature on a sequence ℓ = 〈(m1, y1), (m2, y2)〉 after making
an ECS-sign query on ℓ1 = 〈(m1, y1)〉 but without making an extract query
on y2. This is the type of forgery that all multisignatures schemes (including
the ones discussed in Section 2.1) resist. The second type of forgery in ECS
(called extraction forgery) occurs when the adversary manages to output a valid
ECS signature on ℓ = 〈(m1, y1), (m2, y2)〉 after making an ECS-sign query on
ℓ3 = 〈(m1, y1), (m2, y2), (m3, y3)〉 but without making an extract query on y3
and one of {y1, y2}. A scheme secure against an extraction forgery is said to
be truncation resilient. Note that none of the schemes mentioned in Section 2.1
consider extraction forgery in their security definitions.
Construction: A construction of ECS is given in Appendix A.
3.2 The BGP Routing Protocol
It is helpful to refer to Figure 1 in the following discussion. As mentioned earlier,
this protocol is not resistant to route truncation attacks.
Consider a routing update for a particular destination. This routing update
propagates in a structure represented by a tree rooted at the destination node
with routers at level i representing nodes of the tree at level i of the update (the
root node is considered to be at level 1). For any positive integer i, consider an
arbitrary node at level i+1 of the tree. Label as R1, R2, . . . , Ri+1, the sequence
of nodes in the path from the root node to this node (both inclusive). Denote
by Signi, Verifyi the sign and verify functions of node Ri under an existentially
unforgeable signature scheme. R0 is a constant string used for notational conve-
nience. BGP has two phases: Initialize and Update.
Initialize Let t1 be a timestamp when this update is initiated. The initiator
(R1) sets m1 ← (R0, R1, t1); Sig1 ← Sign1(m1); and U1 ← 〈(m1, Sig1)〉. It
broadcasts U1.
Update On receiving update Ui, node Ri+1 setsmi+1 ← (Ri, Ri+1, ti+1), where
ti+1 is a timestamp when this update was received. The update phase consists
of two stages:
1. Validation: Parse Ui as 〈(m1, sig1), (m2, sig2), . . . , (mi, sigi)〉. Then en-
sure the following:
(a) For each j ∈ [1..i] : mj is of the form (Rj−1, Rj , tj).
(b) For each j ∈ [1..i] : Rj+1 /∈ {R1, R2, . . . , Rj}.
(c) The route to R1 given by the sequence 〈R1, R2, . . . , Ri〉 is either new
or better than an existing route.
(d) For each j ∈ [1..i] : The difference in timestamps, tj+1 − tj is within
a pre-defined threshold t.
(e) For each j ∈ [1..i] : Verifyj(mj , sigj) = VALID.
Abort if any of the above checks fail, otherwise, update routing table
and proceed to the next step.
2. Propagation: Set sigi+1 ← Signi+1(mi+1); Ui+1 ← 〈Ui, (mi+1, sigi+1))〉;
and broadcast Ui+1.
If the update has been successfully been validated and propagated, then we say
that the update has been accepted.
Correctness: Step 1. ensures that the update is of the correct format. If all nodes
are honest then the only steps where validation can fail are
1. Step ii., when Ri+1 ∈ {R1, R2, . . . , Ri}. For instance, referring to Figure 1,
when C’s routing update reaches B.
2. Step iii., when the existing routing table has a better route.
In either case, the protocol behaves correctly and implements BGP [1].
Security: The security is captured in the Validation stage as follows:
1. Step iv. prevents replay attacks.
2. Step v. ensures each node j ∈ [1..i] accepted this update.
Weakness: The weakness in this protocol is that although Step v. ensures that
each node j ∈ [1..i] accepted this update, it does not ensure that these are the
only nodes that accepted this update. Specifically, it does not prevent the route
truncation attack discussed in Section 2. For instance, when Ri+1 receives this
update, it cannot ensure that Ri received this update from Ri−1, since Ri could
have truncated several intermediate entries. Due to this weakness, the above
protocol is not suitable for use in an real-world environment.
Advantages: The primary advantage is that of statelessness - any node Ri never
needs knowledge of Ri+1. Therefore, there is no need to establish knowledge of
immediate neighbors in order to use the protocol. Secondly, since update Ri is
independent of Ri+1, the same update can be used by several nodes at level i+1.
4 Stateless Secure BGP using ECS
As in Section 3.2, let 〈R1, R2, . . .〉 be any arbitrary sequence of nodes that would
be affected by a given update3, and ti be the timestamp at which the update
originated/arrived at node i. Let (xi, yi) be the (private, public) key-pair of node
Ri under an ECS scheme. Assume that every node has a distinct public key. The
SS-BGP protocol is as follows.
Initialize The initiator (R1) sets:m1 ← t1; L1 ← 〈(m1, R1)〉; ℓ1 = (m1, y1); and
σ1 ← ECS-Sign(x1, y1, ℓ1, θ, 1). Finally it sets U1 ← (L1, σ1) and broadcasts
the update U1.
4
Update On receiving update Ui = (Li, σi), node Ri+1 sets mi+1 ← ti+1 and
does the following:
1. Validation: Parse Li as 〈(m1, R1), (m2, R2), . . . , (mi, Ri)〉. Then ensure
the following:
(a) For each j ∈ [1..i] : mj is of the form tj .
(b) For each j ∈ [1..i] : Rj+1 /∈ {R1, R2, . . . , Rj}.
(c) The route to R1 given by the sequence 〈R1, R2, . . . , Ri〉 is either new
or better than an existing route.
(d) For each j ∈ [1..i] : The difference in timestamps, tj+1 − tj is within
the pre-defined threshold t.
(e) Construct the sequence ℓi = 〈(m1, y1), (m2, y2), . . . , (mi, yi)〉 and
test if ECS-Verify(ℓi, σi) = VALID.
Abort if any of the above checks fail, otherwise, update routing table
and proceed to the next step.
2. Propagation: Set Li+1 ← 〈Li, (mi+1, Ri+1)〉; ℓi+1 ← 〈ℓi, (mi+1, yi+1)〉;
σi+1 ← ECS-Sign(xi+1, yi+1,mi+1, ℓi, σi). Finally, set Ui+1 ← (Li+1, σi+1)
and broadcast Ui+1.
3 Note that there will be many such distinct sequences for the same update and R1
would be the first node in all these sequences.
4 Our basic BGP variant only needs to validate the timestamp. However, if any addi-
tional information must be inserted at node i, this can be included as part of mi. A
possible example of such additional information is the GPS coordinates of i.
Correctness: Referring to the basic BGP protocol of Section 3.2, the only dif-
ference is in Step v. Assuming that the validation in this step always passes, the
above protocol then implements BGP in presence of honest users.
Security : The only difference from the protocol of Section 3.2 regarding security
is in Step v., where ECS-Verify is used. First note that if the ECS scheme
is UNF-1 secure then the protocol indeed ensures that each node j ∈ [1..i]
accepted this update. Now consider Figure 1. Then the nodes in the path of the
update received by F for destination A are (A,B,C,D). The update is of the
form UD = (LD, σD), where LD = 〈(tA, A)(tB , B)(tC , C)(tD, D)〉. Consider the
only two possible attacks by F .
1. Route Truncation Attack: As an example, consider the attack of Sec-
tion 2, where given the update
[SA(A⇐), SB(A⇐ B), SC(B ⇐ C), SD(C ⇐ D)] ,
attacker F extracts the update [SA(A⇐)]. In SS-BGP, this translates to F
extracting the ECS signature σA on ℓA given the ECS signature σD on ℓD.
Under the UNF-1 security notion of ECS, this is not possible unless F has
extracted all the private keys of {B,C,D}.
2. Repeating Attack: F simply repeats (forwards) the message received from
D and masquerades as D in the hope of making the route at least one
hop shorter. This attack is unavoidable using all existing methods for wired
networks, including those based on S-BGP and the ones discussed in 2.1. An
attacking node can always forward messages without modification so that its
presence is never detected. However, in the case of wireless networks, there
are possible ways to detect this attack.
Under our original assumption that senders of broadcasts can be uniquely
identified, the repeating attack is not possible. Note that this assumption is
quite strong. A possible way to avoid this assumption would be to encode the
GPS coordinates of each node in the update along with the timestamp (see
Footnote 4). Using this technique, it is possible to determine if a message
was sent via a repeater or not.
Communication Overhead : Assuming that public keys can be uniquely identi-
fied by IP addresses, the sequences ℓi can be constructed at the receiver’s end by
knowing the timestamps (t1, t2, . . . , ti) and IP addresses (R1, R2, . . . , Ri). Con-
sequently, the only overhead in this protocol is that of one single chain signature
σi, which is an element of G1 and is less than 30 bytes using the parameters
of [5]. Contrast this with basic BGP or S-BGP, both of which incur an overhead
of i signatures.
Storage and Performance: The keys are elements of G1 and can be stored in ≤ 30
bytes [5]. The benchmarks of [11] indicate the following performance estimates
of the above protocol (assuming n nodes in the path):
1. Update Propagation: one exponentiation and addition in G1, and one
computation of H (total < 2ms).
2. Update Verification: n pairing computations and multiplications in G2,
and n computations of H (giving < 1 second for n = 100).
To conclude, SS-BGP based on ECS is at least as secure and as computa-
tionally efficient as S-BGP based on the signature schemes of [6,10] without the
extra overhead of neighbor discovery, multiple signature computation, multiple
broadcasts and multiple signatures in each broadcast.
Multiple Updates Aggregation : In the above description, we assumed that each
advertisement Ui contains only one route and is transmitted instantaneously. In
the real world, each advertisement contains multiple routes and is sent periodi-
cally. Fortunately, the ECS scheme allows for signature aggregation and aggregate
verification where a large number of ECS signatures are verified at once [6].
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented an efficient stateless routing protocol for wireless
networks called Stateless Secure BGP (SS-BGP). Our protocol is based on or-
dinary BGP, which allows forwarding nodes to build a routing table without
prior knowledge of neighboring forwarders, and allowing a single broadcast per
node irrespective of the number of neighbors. We call such a protocol stateless.
However, BGP used in this manner does not resist route truncation attacks, and
is therefore useless for practical purposes. In order to prevent such attacks, mod-
ern implementations use a stateful variant of BGP called Secure-BGP (S-BGP).
S-BGP requires forwarding nodes to have prior knowledge of their immediate
neighbors and requires as many broadcasts per node as there are neighbors.
Although sufficient for wired networks, S-BGP has scalability issues in mobile
ad-hoc wireless networks with low data plane traffic because of the need to
constantly keep updated information about neighbors in order to keep updated
routing tables.
SS-BGP is based on stateless BGP and resists route truncation attacks. The
main ingredient of our protocol is an authentication primitive called Enhanced
Chain Signatures (ECS), which is an extension of Chain Signatures (CS) of [5].
The main property of CS and ECS that differentiates them from other multisig-
nature schemes is that in addition to standard authentication, both primitives
also provide truncation resilience (see [5] for a formal discussion of this con-
cept). In our context, this property translates to route truncation resilience in a
stateless implementation of BGP.
In summary, S-BGP incurs the following overhead: (1) neighbor discovery,
(2) multiple signature computation, (3) multiple broadcasts, and (4) multiple
signatures in each broadcast. Although the signature schemes of [6,10] are able
to address issue (4), they do not address the remaining three. SS-BGP based on
ECS is as secure and computationally efficient as S-BGP based on the signature
schemes of [6,10] without any of the above overheads. This feature makes SS-
BGP particularly suited for use in a wireless environment.
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A Construction of ECS
The following construction of ECS is an extension of the CS scheme of [5].
1. Bilinear Maps: Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic multiplicative groups both
of prime order q such that computing discrete logarithms in G1 and G2 is
intractable. A bilinear pairing is a map eˆ : G1 ×G1 7→ G2 that satisfies the
following properties [12,13,6].
(a) Bilinearity: eˆ(ax, by) = eˆ(a, b)xy ∀a, b ∈ G1 and x, y ∈ Zq.
(b) Non-degeneracy: If g is a generator of G1 then eˆ(g, g) is a generator of
G2.
(c) Computability: The map eˆ is efficiently computable.
In a practical implementation, G1 is a subgroup of the (additive) group of
points on the elliptic curve and G2 is the multiplicative subgroup of a finite
field. The map eˆ is derived either from the modified Weil pairing [12,13] or
the Tate pairing [14]. The security of our protocol depends on the hardness of
the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in G1, defined as follows:
given gx, gy ∈ G1 for some generator g and unknowns x, y, compute gxy ∈
G1 [6].
2. Common Parameters: Let eˆ : G1 × G1 7→ G2 be a bilinear map over
cyclic multiplicative groups (G1, G2) of prime order q and g ∈ G1 be a
generator of G1. The prime q is chosen so that the CDH problem in G1 is
requires ≈ 2τ operations for some security parameter τ . See [6] for details.
Let H : {0, 1}∗ 7→ G1 be a hash function. In the rest of this section, these
parameters will be considered common and public.
3. The Algorithms: The following are the three algorithms in the scheme.
ECS-KeyGen. Each user j generates xj
R
← Zq. The private key of j is xj .
The corresponding public key is Yj = g
xj ∈ G1.
ECS-Sign. Let ℓi = 〈(m1, Y1), (m2, Y2), . . . , (mi, Yi)〉 be some sequence of
i distinct (message, public key) pairs. An ECS signature on sequence ℓi
is an element σi ∈ G1, where:
σi =
i∏
j=1
H(〈(m1, Y1), (m2, Y2), . . . , (mj , Yj)〉)
xj ,
and σ0 = 1G1 . The ECS signature σi = ECS-Sign(xi, yi,mi, ℓi−1, σi−1)
is computed by user i ∈ {1, 2, . . .} as
σi ← σi−1 · H(〈(m1, Y1), (m2, Y2), . . . , (mi, Yi)〉)
xi .
ECS-Verify(ℓi, σi). To verify the signature σi on ℓi = 〈(m1, Y1), (m2, Y2), . . . , (mj , Yj)〉,
check that all Yi’s are distinct and the following holds:
eˆ(σi, g)
?
=
i∏
j=1
eˆ(H(〈(m1, Y1), (m2, Y2), . . . , (mj , Yj)〉), Yj).
4. Security: The CS scheme of [5] is shown to be UNF-1-secure. We observe
that the same proof of [5] works for the above ECS construction without
any modification in the simulator. Hence, the above ECS construction is also
UNF-1-secure in the random oracle model under the computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) assumption in bilinear maps. We refer the reader to [5] for
the original proof. A sketch will be given in the full version of this paper on
a preprint archive.
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